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  1An Economic Risk Analysis of No-Till Rice Management from the Landlord’s Perspective 
K. Bradley Watkins, Jason L. Hill, and Merle M. Anders 
Abstract 
Rice production generally involves intensive cultivation.  The profitability of no-till rice 
has been investigated but solely from the producer’s perspective.  Most farmed cropland is 
owned by someone else. This study evaluates the risk efficiency of no-till rice from the 
landlord’s perspective using stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF). 
 
Introduction  
  Arkansas is the top rice producing state in the U.S. and accounts for over 48% of total 
U.S. rice production (USDA ERS 2006).  Nearly all rice production occurs in the eastern part of 
the state in the Mississippi Alluvial Valley.  Surface water quality in this region is significantly 
influenced by geography, climate, and agriculture.  The area has little topographic relief, and 
soils are predominantly composed of dense alluvial clay sub-soils that limit water infiltration 
(Kleiss et al.).  Surface soils contain little organic matter and are comprised of silt and clay 
particles that are readily transported by runoff from tilled fields during heavy rainfall events 
(Huitink et al.).  Sediment is the primary pollutant identified for most eastern Arkansas 
waterways (ADEQ; Huitink et al.), and conservation practices like no-till are commonly 
recommended as remedial mechanisms (Huitink et al.).   
The economics of no-till rice have been investigated using both partial budget analysis 
(Pearce et al.; Smith and Baltazar; Watkins, Anders, and Windham) and whole-farm analysis 
(Watkins et al.).  However, these studies evaluate no-till profitability from the prospective of the 
producer only.  Most farmland under cultivation in eastern Arkansas is owned by someone other 
  2than the producer (Table 1).  In 2002, tenants accounted for 28 percent of farmland acres, while 
part owners (farmers who own and rent farmland) accounted for 48 percent of farmland acres in 
eastern Arkansas.  Moreover, 70 percent of eastern Arkansas farmland acres operated by part 
owners were rented in 2002.  These statistics implicitly highlight the influence of landlords in 
eastern Arkansas agriculture.  Studies investigating the landlord’s role in environmental decision 
making on rented land indicate landlord participation may be based more on economic rather 
than environmental concerns (Constance, Rikoon, and Ma.; Rogers and Vandeman).  Therefore, 
any profitability analysis of no-till rice in eastern Arkansas should also include the landlord’s 
perspective. 
The objective of this study is to evaluate the profitability and risk efficiency of no-till 
management in Arkansas rice production from the perspective of the landlord.  Stochastic crop 
yield and price distributions are simulated for a typical two-year rice-soybean rotation using field 
experiment data from a long-term rice based cropping systems study near Stuttgart, Arkansas and 
secondary price data from the USDA.  Landlord net return distributions are constructed for 
popular rental arrangements in Arkansas rice production, and risk efficient rental arrangements 
are identified for landlords using stochastic efficiency with respect to a function. 
Data and Methods 
  Rental Arrangements. Rental arrangements in eastern Arkansas can be grouped into 
three classifications: 1) crop share arrangements; 2) cost share arrangements; and 3) fixed cash 
arrangements (Bierlen and Parsch; Rainey et al.).  Most rental arrangements in Arkansas rice 
production are crop share arrangements in which the landlord receives a share of the crop and 
government payments, and the tenant pays nearly all expenses related to crop production (Parsch 
and Danforth).  The only expense items shared in crop share arrangements are drying and 
  3irrigation expenses.  Drying expenses are shared in the same proportion as the crop.  Irrigation 
expenses are split into above and below ground expenses, with the tenant paying all above 
ground expenses associated with the irrigation power unit and the landlord paying all below 
ground expenses associated with the well, pump, and gearhead.  The typical split for crop share 
arrangements is 75/25, with the landlord receiving 25% of the crop and government payments.  
However, 80/20 crop share arrangements also exist in Arkansas rice production.   
Cost share arrangements are common in Arkansas rice production, although less frequent 
than crop share arrangements.  The typical split for these arrangements is 50/50 (Parsch and 
Danforth).  The landlord receives 50% of the rice crop and government payments in exchange 
for sharing 50% of seed, pesticide, and fertilizer variable expenses.  The landlord also pays 100% 
of all irrigation expenses with the exception of irrigation labor, which is supplied by the tenant.   
Cost share arrangements are less frequent for soybeans than for rice.  Thus cost share 
arrangements in this analysis are modeled for the rice portion of the rotation only, with crop 
share arrangements modeled for soybeans. 
Fixed cash arrangements are less common than crop share arrangements in Arkansas rice 
production (Parsch and Danforth).  In a fixed cash arrangement, the tenant pays the landlord a 
fixed rate for the use of the land and is responsible for all other production expenses except those 
associated with below ground irrigation.  The tenant receives 100% of the crop and government 
payments.  Rice and soybean cash rents used in the analysis were obtained from 2001 average 
rents reported in Hill et al.  Cash rents were adjusted to 2006 dollars using the Producer Price 
Index.  The resulting cash rents were $117 per acre for rice and $80 per acre for irrigated 
soybeans.   
The rental arrangements modeled for this analysis are as follows: 
  41.  75/25 Crop share (R75S75) 
2.  80/20 Crop share (R80S80) 
3.  50/50 Rice Cost Share - 75/25 Soybean Crop Share -  (R50S75) 
4.  50/50 Rice Cost Share - 80/20 Soybean Crop Share -  (R50S80) 
5.  Fixed Cash (CASH) 
where R = rice; and S = Soybean. 
  Simulated net returns. Landlord rice-soybean rotation net returns were simulated by 
iteration, tillage treatment, and rental arrangement using the following equation: 
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where i = 1 to 500 iterations; j = 1 to 2 tillage treatments (no-till, conventional till); k = 1 to 5 
rental arrangements as defined above; l = 1 to 2 crops (rice, soybean); Skl is the landlord’s share 
of the crop and government payments for rental arrangement k and crop l; Yijl is the simulated 
yield of crop l for tillage treatment j and iteration i (bushels per acre); Pil is the simulated farm 
price for crop l and iteration i ($ per bushel); LDPil is the loan deficiency payment for crop l and 
iteration i ($ per bushel); Dl is the drying charge for crop l ($ per bushel); DPl is the direct 
payment for crop l ($ per acre); CCPil is the counter-cyclical payment for crop l and iteration i ($ 
per acre); LVEkl is the landlord’s variable expenses for rental arrangement k and crop l ($ per 
acre); LFEkl is the landlord’s fixed expenses for rental arrangement k and crop l ($ per acre); and 
Cl is the fixed cash rent for crop l ($ per acre).   
Government payments. Government payments for the study were calculated assuming 
the continuation of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (hereafter referred to as 
the 2002 Farm Bill).  Simulated loan deficiency payments for rice and soybean are calculated as 
follows: 
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where LRl equals the loan rate for crop l ($ per bushel) and il P
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 equals either the simulated world 
market rough rice price or the simulated season average Arkansas soybean price ($ per bushel), 
depending on the crop of interest.  The LRl used for rice and soybeans, respectively was $2.93 
and $5.00 per bushel as per the 2002 Farm Bill. 
Direct payments (DPl) are calculated for each crop as follows: 
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where DPRl and DPYl are the direct payment rate ($ per bushel) and the direct payment yield 
(bushels per acre) for crop l.  The DPRl used for rice and soybean, respectively, was $1.06 and 
$0.44 per bushel as per the 2002 Farm Bill.  The DPYl used for rice and soybean, respectively, 
was 108.9 and 25.7 bushels per acre.  Direct payment yields for rice and soybeans represent 
averages obtained from six Arkansas representative panel farms growing both rice and irrigated 
soybeans (Hignight). 
Simulated counter-cyclical payments (CCPil) were calculated as follows:  
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where TPl is the target price for crop l ($ per bushel), SAFPil is the simulated national season 
average farm price for iteration i and crop l ($ per bushel), CCPYl is the counter cyclical payment 
yield for crop l (bushels per acre), and  DPRl is as defined above.  The TPl used for rice and 
soybean, respectively was $4.73 and $5.80 bushels per acre as per the 2002 Farm Bill.  The 
CCPYl used for rice and soybean, respectively, was 122.6 and 33.2 bushels per acre, and 
represent averages obtained from six Arkansas representative panel farms growing both rice and 
irrigated soybeans (Hignight).  
  6  Simulated yields and prices. SIMETAR, developed by Richardson et al. was used to 
simulate yield and price distributions in the study.  Multivariate empirical distributions (MVEs) 
were used to simulate 500 iterations of yields and prices.  A MVE distribution simulates random 
values from a frequency distribution made up of actual historical data and has been shown to 
appropriately correlate random variables based on their historical correlation (Richardson, Klose, 
and Gray).  Parameters for the MVE include the means, deviations from the mean or trend 
expressed as a fraction of each variable, and the correlation among variables.  The MVE 
distribution is used in instances where data observations are too few to estimate parameters for 
another distribution (Pendell et al.). 
  Rice and soybean yield distributions under conventional till (CT) and no-till (NT) were 
simulated using seven years of historical yield data from a long term rice-based cropping systems 
study at Stuttgart, AR for the period 2000-2006 (Anders et al.).  The historical crop yields 
represent yields obtained in a two-year rice-soybean rotation.  Historical yields were detrended 
using linear regression, and residuals from the trend were used to estimate the parameters for the 
MVE yield distributions.  The mean yield values over the 7-year period were used as the average 
yields for the MVE yield distributions.  Summary statistics for the simulated yields are presented 
in Table 2. 
Price distributions were simulated using season average Arkansas rice and  soybean price 
data (USDA NASS 2006), world market rice price data (USDA ERS 2006), and national average 
rice and soybean price data (USDA, ERS 2006, 2007) for the period 2000-2006.  The season 
average world market rice price for each year was determined by averaging observations from 
August 15 through October 31 of each year.  Historical prices were detrended using linear 
regression, and residuals from the trend were used to estimate the parameters of the MVE price 
  7distributions.  Mean prices for the period 2004-2006 rather than historical means were used as 
average prices for the MVE price distributions.  Prices for the latter three years of the 7-yr period 
better represent current farmer price expectations.  The MVE approach has been shown to 
reproduce the historical correlation matrix and maintain the historical coefficient of variation 
from the original historical data series even when using means different from the historical mean 
(Ribera et al.).  Summary statistics for simulated prices are presented in Table 2. 
  Risk analysis. Rental arrangements are ranked for landlords and tenants according to risk 
attitudes using stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF).  The SERF method is a 
variant of stochastic dominance with respect to a function (SDRF) that orders a set of risky 
alternatives in terms of certainty equivalents (CE)
 calculated for specified ranges of risk attitudes 
(Hardaker et al.).  A certainty equivalent (CE) is equal to the amount of certain payoff an 
individual would require to be indifferent between that payoff and a risky investment.  The CE is 
typically less than the expected (mean) monetary value and greater than or equal to the minimum 
monetary value of a stream of monetary outcomes (Hardaker et al.).  The SERF method allows 
for simultaneous rather than pairwise comparison of risky alternatives and can in some instances 
produce a smaller efficient set than conventional SDRF (Hardaker et al.).  Graphical presentation 
of SERF results facilitates the presentation of ordinal rankings for decision makers with different 
risk attitudes and provides a cardinal measure of a decision maker’s conviction for preferences 
among risky alternatives at each risk aversion level by interpreting differences in CE values for a 
given risk aversion level as risk premiums (Hardaker et al.). 
  The SERF method calls for calculating CE values over a range of absolute risk aversion 
coefficients (ARACs).  The ARAC represents a decision maker’s degree of risk aversion.  
Decision makers are risk averse if ARAC > 0; risk neutral if ARAC = 0, and risk preferring if 
  8ARAC < 0.  The range of ARAC values used in this analysis was from 0 (risk neutral) to 0.035 
(strongly risk averse).  The latter value was calculated using the formula proposed by Hardaker 
et al. of ra(w) = rr(w)/w, where ra(w) = absolute risk aversion with respect to wealth (w), and 
rr(w) =  relative risk aversion with respect to wealth.  In this analysis, rr(w) was set to 4 (very risk 
averse) as proposed by Anderson and Dillon, and w equals the landlord’s average net return 
across alternative rental arrangements in Table 3 of $114/acre (Hardaker et al.).   
The SERF procedure in SIMETAR was used to calculate CE values by rental 
arrangement for the landlord ARAC ranges specified above.  A negative exponential utility 
function was used to calculate CE values for each ARAC range (Hardaker et al.).  Landlord NT 
risk premiums were calculated for each rental arrangement by subtracting conventional till CE 
values from no-till CE values at given ARAC values, and a landlord CE graph was constructed 
to display ordinal rankings of rental arrangements across each specified range of ARAC values. 
Results and Discussion 
Summary statistics of simulated landlord net returns by rental arrangement and tillage 
method are presented in Table 3.  Average returns to the landlord are approximately equal for 
no-till relative to conventional till management for every rental arrangement analyzed in the 
study.  Therefore, risk-neutral landlords desiring to maximize expected returns would be 
indifferent as to whether the tenant used NT or CT on rented land.  The NTR50S75 and 
CTR50S75 arrangements have the largest average net return for the landlord ($135 and $136 per 
acre, respectively), while the CASH arrangement produces the smallest average net return for the 
landlord ($85 per acre).  Landlord return variability is slightly smaller for NT than for CT for all 
rental arrangements evaluated with the exception of CASH.  The NTR80S80 and CTR80S80 
arrangements are the least desirable for the landlord relative to the other rental arrangements 
  9evaluated.  Both arrangements result in the largest probabilities of receiving a net return lower 
than cash rent (33 percent for NTR80S80; 38 percent for CTR80S80). 
  Landlord certainty equivalents (CEs) and no-till risk premiums are presented by rental 
arrangement for various absolute risk aversion coefficients (ARAC) in Table 4.  Certainty 
equivalents are equal to mean (expected) net returns when ARAC = 0 but decline slightly as 
ARACs become larger (e.g., as risk aversion increases) for the landlord.  Certainty equivalent 
values are slightly larger for NT than for CT for ARAC values greater than 0.  Thus, landlords 
receive positive risk premiums for NT management as risk aversion increases, but the risk 
premiums are relatively small, implying small monetary benefits to NT for risk averse landlords.    
  Landlord SERF results are presented across the ARAC range of 0 (risk neutral) to 0.035 
(strong risk aversion) in Figure 1.  Strategies that are risk preferred in Figure 1 have the locus of 
points of highest CE values (Hardaker et al.).  The NTR50S75 arrangement is the preferred 
strategy for the landlord for most ARAC values greater than 0, followed closely by the 
CTR75S25 arrangement.  These arrangements allow the landlord to receive a larger share of the 
rice crop and rice government payments relative to the other rental arrangements evaluated.  The 
CASH arrangement is the least preferred for the landlord, followed by the CTR80S80 and the 
NRTR80S80 arrangements.  Rental arrangements using NT management dominate rental 
arrangements using CT management at most ARAC values greater than 0.  Thus the landlord’s 
preference for NT increases slightly with increasing levels of risk aversion for all rental 
arrangements examined. 
Summary and Conclusions 
  This analysis evaluated the profitability and risk efficiency of no-till management in 
Arkansas rice production from the prospective if the landlord using simulation and stochastic 
  10efficiency with respect to a function (SERF).  Crop yields and prices were simulated for a typical 
two-year rice-soybean rotation using multivariate empirical distributions (MVEs).  Landlord net 
return distributions were constructed for popular rental arrangements used in Arkansas rice 
production.  The landlord’s perspective was evaluated because the majority of cropland farmed 
in eastern Arkansas is owned by someone other than the producer. 
Landlord preferences for no-till management depend on risk attitude.  Risk neutral 
landlords would be indifferent between no-till or conventional till, because expected (mean) 
returns to the landlord are essentially equal for both tillage methods across all rental 
arrangements examined.  Risk-averse landlords would have a slight preference for no-till, since 
no-till risk premiums are positive with increasing levels of risk aversion across all rental 
arrangements examined with the exception of fixed cash arrangements.  However, no-till risk 
premiums are relatively modest.  Thus monetary benefits to no-till management appear to be 
small for risk-averse landlords, implying these landlords may be largely indifferent as to whether 
no-till or conventional till is used on rented cropland. 
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  15Table 1. Land Tenure Data by Type of Operator, Eastern Arkansas, 2002 
Operator Acres
  Percent 
Full Owner  1,805,073  24% 
Part Owner  3,589,388  48% 
Tenant  2,066,404  28% 
Total  7,460,865  100% 
Part Owner  Acres  Percent 
Owned  1,087,431  30% 
Rented  2,501,957  70% 
Total  3,589,388  100% 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture-National Agricultural Statistics 
Service. 2002 Census of Agriculture: Arkansas State and County Data.  
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of Simulated Yields and Prices. 
Variable Mean 
a SD CV 
b Minimum Maximum 
NT Rice Yield (bu/acre) 
c 177.02 15.54  8.78  160.46  204.76 
CT Rice Yield (bu/acre)  183.50 15.89  8.66  152.53  201.28 
NT Soybean Yield (bu/acre)  48.90 5.06 10.35  40.42  55.53 
CT Soybean Yield (bu/acre)  45.15 17.39 38.52 14.65 69.03 
Arkansas Rice Farm Price ($/bu)  3.55  0.47 13.17 2.86  4.18 
Arkansas Soybean Farm Price ($/bu)  6.10 0.60 9.82 5.35 7.47 
Rice World Market Price ($/bu)  2.79 0.27 9.53 2.45 3.21 
National Rice Farm Price ($/bu)  3.71  0.45 12.12 3.05  4.31 
National Soybean Farm Price ($/bu)  5.87  0.70 11.98 5.17  7.58 
a Summary statistics calculated from 500 simulated iterations.  
b Coefficient of Variation (CV) is a unitless measure of relative risk and is equal to the standard deviation (SD) 
divided by the mean. 
c NT = No-Till; CT = Conventional till. 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics of Simulated Landlord Net Returns by Rental Arrangement and Tillage Method.   
Arrangement   Mean 
a SD CV 
b Minimum  Maximum  Prob. NR < C 
c
 -----------$/acre-----------    ------------$/acre------------   
NTR75S75
d 116 12 10.6 91 158  0% 
CTR75S75  116 19 16.5 70 171  4% 
NTR80S80  91 10  10.9 70  124 33% 
CTR80S80  90 15  16.9 53  134 38% 
NTR50S75  135 21 15.7 91 208  0% 
CTR50S75  136 27 20.1 67 215  2% 
NTR50S80  128 21 16.2 85 198  0% 
CTR50S80  128 25 19.8 64 202  3% 
CASH  85 0 0.0 85  85  0% 
a Summary statistics calculated from 500 simulated iterations.  
b Coefficient of Variation (CV) is a unitless measure of relative risk and is equal to the standard deviation (SD) 
divided by the mean. 
c Probability of receiving a net return less than cash rent.   
d NT = No-Till; CT = Conventional Till; R = Rice portion of rotation; S = Soybean portion of rotation; 75, 80, 
50 = tenant’s share of the crop in crop/cost share arrangement; CASH = fixed cash arrangement. 
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Table 4. Landlord Certainty Equivalents and No-Till Risk Premiums by 
Rental Arrangement for Various Absolute Risk Aversion Coefficients.  
 Absolute  Risk  Aversion Coefficients (ARAC) 
Arrangement  0.000  0.009 0.018 0.026 0.035 
 Certainty  Equivalents  ($/acre) 
NTR75S75 
a 116  116 115 115 114 
CTR75S75  116  115 113 112 110 
NTR80S80  91  90 90 89 89 
CTR80S80  90  89 88 87 86 
NTR50S75  135  134 132 130 128 
CTR50S75  136  132 129 126 123 
NTR50S80  128  126 124 123 121 
CTR50S80  128  126 123 120 118 
CASH  85  85 85 85 85 
  No-Till Risk Premiums ($/acre) 
R75S75  0  1 2 3 4 
R80S80  0  1 1 2 3 
R50S75  0  1 3 4 5 
R50S80  -1  0 1 2 3 
CASH  0  0 0 0 0 
a NT = No-Till; CT = Conventional Till; R = Rice portion of rotation; S 
= Soybean portion of rotation; 75, 80, 50 = tenant’s share of the crop in 
crop/cost share arrangement; CASH = fixed cash arrangement. 
 
  19Figure 2. Landlord SERF Results Over Absolute Risk Aversion Range of 0.000-0.035, 
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